

Indian Response to Junagadh's Accession with Pakistan: A Critical Analysis

Muhammad Mehboob^{*}

Abstract

The Kathiawar Muslim state of Junagadh, ruled by the Babi dynasty for the last two centuries, in September 1947, prompted a strong and complex response from India, ultimately leading to its occupation and annexation. This article critically analyses India's reaction after the legal accession of the state, focusing on political manoeuvres, the creation of the Provisional Government called Arzi Hukumat, the economic blockade, and military intervention. The research is exploratory and explanatory, drawing on primary sources such as official documents, newspapers, and personal correspondence. Politically, India opposed the decision of the Nawab of Junagadh due to Junagadh's geographical location and its Hindu-majority population. Indian leaders such as Sardar Patel and V.P. Menon engaged in subversive efforts and public discourse to challenge Pakistan's claim. In response, they established the Arzi Hukumat under Samaldas Gandhi, who served as the head of the provisional government and played a role in Junagadh's integration into India through violence. Drawing on archival data, this study examines Arzi Hekmat's role in mobilising resistance and influencing India's strategy. It provides a nuanced understanding of India's integration of Junagadh, revealing how political strategy, economic pressure, and military force shaped state consolidation. Additionally, it contributes to discussions on post-independence territorial disputes and India's approach to integrating princely states.

Keywords: Junagadh, Accession, India-Pakistan Relations, Arzi Hukumat, Economic Blockade, Military Intervention, Princely States

^{*} PhD Scholar at the Department of History, Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad.
Muhammadmehboob408@gmail.com

Introduction

During the partition of British India, the most neglected and underexplored aspect of history concerns the princely states and their dramatic, forced accession to India to prevent its balkanization. During the British colonial era, India was primarily divided into three main territories (Dar, 2014). The first comprised regions directly governed by the British Crown, known as the British Indian Provinces. The second encompassed tribal areas, where the British had established agreements with the residents. The third was particularly significant, consisting of more than 565 princely states (Raghavan, 2010). During the partition of India, the number of saluting and ancillary states was 232 and 333 were estates and talukas. Most of them were located in Kathiawar, Gujarat (Zaidi, 2003).

The British Indian Provinces and tribal areas accounted for 60% of the Indian territory, while the princely states accounted for 40%. Similarly, their population was one-fourth of the total population in 1947 (Bangash, 2015). The division of territory was administrative in nature. Princely states accounted for one-third of the total area of British India and were under the suzerainty of the British Crown. On February 20, 1947, the British Government announced its definitive intention to take necessary steps to transfer power into responsible Indian hands by a date no later than June 1948 (Mansergh & Lumby, 1983).

The policy for partitioning the subcontinent aimed to create two separate and independent nations: India and Pakistan. This division was primarily shaped by two important documents: the 3rd June Plan, introduced by Mountbatten, and the Indian Independence Act of 1947, passed by the British Parliament. For the regions that were under direct British rule, the guidelines for the transition were clearly set out in these key documents. However, the situation was different for the Princely States, which were governed indirectly. Article 2(4) of the Indian Independence Act specified that no princely state would be compelled to join either India or Pakistan. Additionally, Article 7(1) declared that all treaties and agreements between the British Crown and the Princely States would come to an end. This laid the groundwork for the sovereignty of these states during the partition process. (Mansergh & Lumby, 1983).

Two new sovereign and independent states emerged on 15th August 1947 after the partition of British India. The process of partition was straightforward in some places, simply because the rules of partition were followed in letter and spirit. Unfortunately, even Lord Mountbatten, the Viceroy General, who then became the Governor General of independent India, did not follow these principles, particularly in the case of princely states. To get and achieve the maximum number of Indian princely states in India, Sardar Vallabhai Patel asked Lord Mountbatten to bring in “a full basket of apples by the date of independence”. Lord Mountbatten, on his part, made a full effort to bring the entire basket into the Indian fold (Hodson, 1969). Before 15th August 1947, the date set by the British for the power transfer to the newly created sovereign

countries of Pakistan and India, two princely states had not decided to link themselves to either dominion.

These two states were Kashmir and Hyderabad, but the Junagadh State formally showed its intention to link with Pakistan on 15th August 1947 (Dastur Amal, Sarkar Junagadh, 1947). Kashmir had signed a Standstill Agreement with Pakistan (Dar, 2014). In the future, the Maharaja of Kashmir was willing to maintain the state's independent status. The same was the policy of Hyderabad, but it didn't sign any Standstill Agreement with either Pakistan or India. As per the policy and principles designed for princely states, granted by the British Crown, the Junagadh State formally stated that it had decided to accede to Pakistan (Nawab of Junagadh, 1947). Pakistan formally announced the acceptance of the accession of Junagadh on 15th September 1947 (Dawn, September 17, 1947).

Indian leadership opposed the accession and adopted several tactics and measures to stop the accession to Pakistan. Junagadh State remained with Pakistan till 9th November 1947, before the occupation of Junagadh by India with military might and the use of force. The division of British India was intended to be conducted in accordance with clearly defined principles to ensure a fair and peaceful transition. However, in practice, these principles were not adhered to, leading to significant challenges and conflicts.

The Viceroy at that time in India, and then he became a major leading part of the Indian cabinet that took decisions regarding Junagadh, Lord Mountbatten, changed the set principles from agreed rules given by the British Government, particularly regarding the princely states, which contributed to the controversies surrounding the partition process, especially in Junagadh. VP Menon also stated in his book about the support he provided by him. This paper tends to investigate the implications of India's response and its impact on the partition process, focusing on the extent to which the principles of partition were compromised. The central question and aim of the study are to investigate how the accession process to Pakistan unfolded and what key challenges it faced during this historical process.

After the partition of British India and accession of states, different historians from different perspectives have written about the affairs of the princely states. They have critically reviewed and examined the internal dynamics, diverse ethnicities and cultural variations of these states and their relations with the British Paramount Power. There are multiple works present, but with regard to all those states that acceded to Pakistan is *A Princely Affair*, which is a scholarly contribution by historian Yaqoob Khan Bangash. In his academic contribution, the author discussed in detail the integration process of states that acceded to and were integrated with Pakistan, and briefly described Junagadh. This work examines how these joined the newly formed country after the division. It focuses on the challenges and strategies involved in integrating these states into Pakistan between 1947 and 1955.

Yaqoob Khan also provided us with a detailed account of the political negotiations through diplomatic channels by India and Pakistan, pressures,

and conflicts among the princely rulers, Pakistan's government response, and the people living in these states. This work also investigates the process that shaped Pakistan's early years and its political, cultural, economic and administrative structure. As this book discusses in detail, about all those states that acceded with Pakistan but this book did not provide a detailed, case-specific analysis of Junagadh's accession, which was first state of Pakistan signed the instrument of accession. As this book focuses on Pakistan's integration process after the accession of those states that were geographically linked with it, the book provides no account of India's reaction to Junagadh's accession to Pakistan, including the political and military measures taken by India.

Similarly, there is a very important work, *Jinnah's Pakistan*, which covers the sensitive time period of state formation by Jinnah, by Farooq Ahmad Dar. This work explores in detail the creation of Pakistan, focusing on Muhammad Ali Jinnah's leadership and his role as Governor General. This book also discusses in detail various issues faced by new born state. The author also gives a brief account of the princely states but the Junagadh episode is not discussed in detail. The accession process led to various difficulties and challenges to new born state and its leadership including Jinnah.

Most of the Indian authors and historians from India have also written about the process of integration and accession including *India After Gandhi* by Ramachandra Guha. This work is a comprehensive study of India's history since independence. This book highlighted the key leaders, the impact of India's diverse cultures and religions, and the difficulties of uniting such a vast and diverse country. The book covers significant events such as the Partition, the rise of democracy, the challenges of development, and India's growth as a global power. It highlights both the achievements and the challenges faced by India in the post-independence period.

Two major accounts on this topic by British authors are Conrad Cornfield and H.V. Hodson, which discuss this in detail. Cornfield's book provides firsthand information about policy formation because he was head of the Political Department in the State Department. Menon wrote a brief account on the "Indian Integration of princely states". This book is basically about those states which acceded to India, but lacks detailed accounts on Junagadh. The accession process of Junagadh and the Indian occupation are not fully described in this book. Hodson also wrote a complete chapter in his book on Junagadh, but limited his work to the accession story.

Habib Lakhani's Urdu account, *Ilhaq-e-Junagadh*, offers a detailed discussion of Junagadh but omits the British manipulation of facts regarding the state's accession. Ankit's two research articles are a useful introduction to the basic idea of state accession in the context of state sovereignty. Rakesh Ankit examines the complex and controversial events surrounding the Partition of India and Junagadh's episode. They focus on how this decision created tension, as with a majority-Hindu population, with a Muslim ruler who chose to accede to Pakistan.

Ankit explores how this decision highlighted problems left by British colonial rule, particularly in the management of princely states and their freedom to decide their future. The newly independent Indian government viewed Junagadh's decision as a threat to national unity and responded with both diplomatic efforts and military force to take control of the state. The article shows how Junagadh's case was part of the broader challenge of building a united nation after independence. This paper tends to fill the gap by providing a complete study of this historical process that shaped and determined the future policies of Pakistan while conducting its relations with India. This study will also provide an account of tools and tactics used by India against the Junagadh.

There is limited literature on the accession of states in the context of Junagadh. There are only four major primary sources on this issue. These sources can inform policy formation and its implications during the accession of princely states, particularly in Junagadh. The Transfer of Power 1942-47 is a detailed primary source on the partition of India. This source is useful for understanding policy formation, but it does not discuss the aftermath of the creation of Pakistan and India or the affairs of Junagadh.

The two main primary sources on Junagadh are India-Pakistan Relations 1947-2007, published by India, and the Jinnah Papers, published in Pakistan. These are two major accounts, each with two specific chapters. Junagadh provides a basic understanding of official conversations between India and Pakistan. These chapters present official conversations and give narratives from each country. The archival records of Pakistani and Indian newspapers also provide a basic understanding of the issue.

Significance and Scope of Research

On the Kashmir issue, both nationally and internationally, an abundance of research is available, whereas there is little research available for further study on this topic, the Junagadh issue. Only primary data is available in an archive, which has not been explored by researchers to study the issue from different perspectives. This study aims to highlight the principles, rules and policy regarding princely states, particularly the Junagadh State, in this context.

Objectives and Methodology

The primary objective is to address the research gap on this topic from multiple angles, particularly the accession of states and policy formation. This research also aims to open new avenues for further research on this topic. To conduct this research an exploratory and descriptive method will be used. This work will also examine the challenges and impacts of accession, provided by primary data sources and a qualitative approach will be used.

To conduct this study archival records, newspapers and Gujarati literature will also be consulted. This study will be divided into the following sections. The first section will cover the Congress Policy on Princely States during Partition. The second section will focus on

Junagadh's Accession to Pakistan. The third section will discuss India's Response to Junagadh's Accession, including Political Measures, the Formation of the Arzi Hukumat (Provisional Government), Economic Blockade, and finally Military Action.

Congress and League Policy on Princely States during Partition

Initially, Congress's policy was one of non-interference and friendly relations with the princes. Congress demanded representative governments in the princely states and the sovereign rights of the people in those states. Many princes and rulers of the princely states were fearful of and disliked Nehru. During the Quit India Movement in 1942, Gandhi advised the princes of the states to join him; otherwise, "When I am gone, Nehru will have no patience with you" (Burke & Quraishi, 1994). Congress's policy became more visible during the 51st Congress Session, held in Haripura in 1938. Congress set up local Congress Committees in the states. The branches of the All-India States People Conference (AISPC) were set up alongside other local political organisations in the states, with Congress sympathisers involved in AISPC activities. While addressing the AISPC meeting in January 1946, Pundit Nehru rejected the possibility of a union of states within a federation with full autonomy. He threatened that if they (the rulers) formed any unit, their status would be only as "constitutional heads under a democratic system of government" (Zaidi, 2003).

On April 18, 1947, at the All-India States People's Conference in Gwalior, Jawaharlal Nehru made a strong declaration. He stated that any state that chose not to join the Indian Constituent Assembly would be viewed as hostile and would need to bear the consequences of that stance (Burke & Quraishi, 1994). During the partition, the Congress Party took steps to encourage unrest in states that were reluctant to align with India, often working with local organisations like the Paraja Mandal to stir up opposition against ruling authorities (Cornfield, 1975). This agitation reflected the growing discontent among people opposed to their rulers. In a meeting of the Standing Committee of the State People's Conference on June 11 and 12, 1947, it was decided that if any state refused to join the Constituent Assembly, then the assembly would allow the residents of that state to elect their own representatives (Burke & Quraishi, 1994).

According to a memorandum from the Cabinet Mission in May 1946, when British India achieved independence, the British government would no longer be able to uphold its paramountcy over the princely states. As a result the British Crown would return all the treaties and agreements to the States. It also meant that was the end of the British paramountcy. Instead, it created a vacuum that the states could fill either by forming a federal connection with the new Indian governments or by establishing their own political arrangements (Mansergh & Lumby, 1983).

Muslim League and Muhammad Ali Jinnah's policy towards princely states was clearly articulated in his statement of 17th June 1947. This statement reflected his legalistic approach towards princely states and the explanation of British policy set out in the Cabinet Mission Memorandum of

12th May 1946 and the 3rd June Plan. Historians Burke and Quraishi termed Jinnah's views as legalistic regarding states (Burke & Quraishi, 1994).

Muhammad Ali Jinnah emphasised that they had not intended to interfere in the internal affairs of any state, as this matter would primarily be resolved between the rulers and the people of those states. He made it clear that any states wishing to join the Pakistan Constitutional Assembly of their own free will and to discuss or negotiate with us would find us ready and willing to engage with them. He assured the rulers of these states that if they preferred to remain independent and wished to negotiate or establish any political, commercial, or economic relationships with Pakistan, we would be happy to discuss these matters and reach a settlement that would benefit both parties. (Zaidi, 2003).

Junagadh's Announcement of the decision

This State was a major princely state in the southwestern part of the Kathiawar peninsula of the Indian Subcontinent. The state's total area was 3,336 sq. miles, with almost 84 miles of coastline along the Arabian Sea. The state of Junagadh had 16 ports, of which Veraval port was the principal port (Guha, 2007). The total number of cities and towns was 999. At the time of partition, over 80% of Junagadh's population was Hindu. In addition, Junagadh had 23 attached states and talukas. Junagadh enjoyed a special privilege, being the fifth state in terms of revenue generation and the second among the Muslim princely states. Junagadh State had a sea link with Pakistan and was surrounded by territories that had already acceded to India. Similarly, within Junagadh, there were pockets of territory that were part of other princely States.

The Nawab of Junagadh, Nawab Mahabat Khanji by exercising his legal right and sovereignty over state and subject announced his decision to accede with newly formed Muslim state of Pakistan on 15th August 1947. During those days he also wrote to Jinnah and sent his delegation to Pakistan. This decision was also published in the official gazette of Junagadh called as *Dastrulral Amal Sarkar*. The government of Pakistan accepted the decision of Junagadh on 15th September 1947. So the instrument of accession was signed by two sovereigns of Pakistan and Junagadh. Junagadh became part of Pakistan legally (Zaidi, 2003). As per the agreement of accession Junagadh provided the control of defence, communications and foreign affairs to Pakistan while the Nawab of Junagadh was sovereign in internal affairs of the state.

India's Response to Junagadh's Accession

The following were the steps taken by the Indian leadership to counter Junagadh's accession to Pakistan.

1. Political Measures

The Indian leadership was deeply upset by the Nawab of Junagadh's decision to accede to Pakistan. They argued that Junagadh lacked a true historical connection to Pakistan and pointed out that a significant portion

of its population was Hindu. India raised strong objections against this accession, highlighting that Junagadh was surrounded by territories that were already part of India. They also noted that certain regions within Junagadh were associated with other princely states that had joined India, and conversely, some Indian territories were located within the boundaries of Junagadh.

On September 12, 1947, Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru reached out to Liaquat Ali Khan, expressing India's openness to any democratic process concerning Junagadh's future. Nehru conveyed that India was willing to respect the will of the people, as long as the referendum was conducted under the joint oversight of both India and Junagadh. However, he warned that if the Nawab chose to avoid a referendum and if Pakistan disregarded the people's wishes by formalising Junagadh's inclusion, India could not accept such a decision.

Another tactic they used was pressurisation and persuasion to get the Nawab Mahabat Khanji to withdraw the announcement and accede to India. On the instructions of the Government, Menon, Secretary of State and close aide to Sardar Patel, visited the Junagadh State on 19th September to force the Nawab Mahabat Khanji to accede to India, but couldn't see the Nawab because he was ill. When India lost hope of persuading the ruler and his Dewan to change their minds, it used two major tactics to bring the Junagadh State to administrative collapse. First was an economic blockade, and the other was the creation of Arzi Hukumat (The Provisional Government) (Menon, 1956).

Indian leadership launched a campaign across Navanagar and other states to spread propaganda that Hindus were in danger in Junagadh. On 25th September 1947, a Press statement issued by the States Ministry also clearly set out its position on Junagadh. The statement explained the effects of the state's accession on Kathiawar. It also raised the issue of Mangrol and Babariawad, which were under Junagadh's suzerainty under the 1943 attachment scheme. The statement further stated that, to check the opinion of the people of Junagadh, the Government of India had suggested a referendum. The Government of India consistently maintained the same policy regarding Junagadh until the occupation of Junagadh by military forces on 9th November 1947.

2. Formation of the Arzi Hukumat (Provisional Government) and its activities

The Arzi Hukumat was established in Bombay on September 25, 1947, under the presidency of Samaldas Gandhi. Its headquarters were later relocated to Rajkot, near the Junagadh State. During a meeting at the Taj Mahal Hotel with leaders of the Congress, Samaldas Gandhi expressed that people were ready to take the law into their own hands and that they would organise themselves to march on Junagadh (Hodson, 1969). On October 27, 1947, Sir Shah Nawaz Bhutto wrote to Jinnah detailing the activities of the Arzi Hukumat. He reported that their main sources of

revenue, including railways and customs, had collapsed. The food situation was extremely challenging, although Pakistan had generously provided an allotment of food grains to assist. Additionally, he noted the harsh treatment of Muslims travelling on the Kathiawar railway lines, who faced various hardships and humiliations (Zaidi, 2003).

On 17th November 1947, during an address to the people of Kathiawar and other parts of India, who took part in the activities of Arzi Hukmat against the Nawab of Junagadh, he stated that “All the honour go to Sardar Patel, who was kind enough to give me every possible guidance and cooperation” (Dawn, November 19, 1947). While urging the people to vote only for India, he threatened the people of Junagadh, especially Muslims. His warning was that “If Muslims vote for Pakistan, we will know who are not loyal to the Union. We cannot keep serpents and scorpions alive, moving under our own pillows. We must put them to death. We will see who votes for Pakistan” (Dawn, November 19, 1947).

3. Economic Blockage of the state

Junagadh State was surrounded by Indian territories and all those states that had already acceded to India. For its existence and major imports for survival, the state heavily relied on India. It also depended upon India for other services like railways, customs, postal communications, and trade routes. When Pakistan accepted the accession of Junagadh on 15th September 1947, a meeting of the Indian cabinet was held on September 17, 1947. In this meeting it was decided by the Indian leadership including Mountbatten to fortify the area with troops and implement an economic blockade. This blockade aimed to cut off critical supplies of diesel oil, coal, and petrol from India and its princely states (Zaidi, 2003).

Vijay Sinh Parmar is a Gujarati author and has contributed mostly to this historical process. He highlighted that during this campaign against the Nawab of Junagadh, the economic blockade was used as a powerful strategy during the Arzi Hukumat. These activities largely revolved around an economic boycott orchestrated to challenge the Nawab's authority by support of Indian leadership. Historian S. V. Jani is also a very important figure in writing history about Junagadh. In his book *Saurashtra no Itihas*, detailed how boycott committees were formed in various cities across India to bring Junagadh's economy towards breakdown. These committees formed by the leadership of Arzi Hukumat were part of a broader plan to destroy the state structure, led by Gandhi's nephew, Shamaldas, and focused on applying pressure on the Nawab's regime to reverse its decision. The prominent name was Pushpaben Mehta, who headed the specially created economic boycott department, organising efforts in cities like Calcutta, Mumbai, Madras, and Cochin (Jani, 2010).

The committees openly threatened the business community and ordered them to take proactive steps by sending letters to businesses, urging them to stop supplying essential goods such as petrol, kerosene, clothing, sugar, and grains to Junagadh. The Indian government also put

an economic blockade around the state to stop the coal supplies beginning October 1, 1947, intensifying the economic pressure. Just a few days later, on October 3, 1947, Sir Shah Nawaz informed Ikramullah, the Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Pakistan, requesting their support and guidance (Zaidi, 2003).

4. Military Action

Subsequently, when it was reported in the newspapers on 17th September 1947 that the Government of Pakistan had accepted the accession, the cabinet of Indian Ministers met to examine the situation in Junagadh. According to Lord Mountbatten, before the meeting, Indian leaders, including Nehru and Sardar Patel, had decided that the only answer to Junagadh was "military action" (Hodson, 1969). According to Alan Campbell-Johnson's note, the Indian Cabinet had prepared a plan for military action on 17th September 1947. He noted that the Indian Cabinet had fully prepared itself to approve military measures (Zaidi, 2003).

Mountbatten reported to the British King that Prime Minister Nehru and Deputy Prime Minister Sardar Patel had a militant attitude concerning the state of Junagadh (Hodson, 1969). Reviewing the minutes from the Cabinet meeting held on September 17, 1947, it is evident that, in addition to stationing troops around Junagadh, the government decided to sever the supply line. Economic measures included discontinuing the supply of diesel oil, coal, and petrol from both the territories of the Indian Dominion and the acceding States (Zaidi, 2003).

On 19 September 1947, Pakistan strongly protested to India over issue of stationing near Junagadh, calling it a "Hostile Act" (Bhasin, 2008, No. 1948). The Indian cabinet met again on 24 September 1947 on the Junagadh issue. According to the minutes of this meeting, in addition to deploying a brigade in Kathiawar, Indian troops were also to be deployed in Babariawad and Mangrol (Bhasin, 2008, No. 1948). It is also important to note that Mangrol and Babariawad were claimed by the state of Junagadh, whose exact and clear legal status was disputed. Despite this disputed status, India decided to carry out military operations in these two states. On 24 September 1947, they formed the Kathiawar Defence Force under the leadership of Sardar Gardial Singh. This force consisted of an entire brigade. This brigade also included troops from the acceding states of Kathiawar to India. Prime Minister Nehru again confided in Patel on 25 September that "we are already considering the possibility of military action" (Madhavan, 2003).

On 25 September 1947, Pakistan's Foreign Office declared that India's actions at Junagadh were against Pakistan's sovereignty. "The Pakistan Government feel India's Dominion by their policy and action is infringing the sovereignty of Pakistan" (Bhasin, 2008, No. 1948). When the Indian leadership decided to attack Mangrol and Babariawad, the heads of the three Indian services expressed their concerns about the implications of this attack before the Indian Cabinet. According to them, military action in Kathiawar, especially in Junagadh, would bring both countries to the

brink of war. They urged the Indian leadership to resolve the problem by talks rather than military action. The Indian leadership became angry at the Chiefs of Staff's advice against military action and called it disloyal and improper. After a protest by the Indian leadership on paper, they returned their paper (Zaidi, 2003).

Finally, the strongest voice against Indian aggression in Junagadh and Kathiawar was silenced. Historian H.V. Hodson has noted in his book *The Great Divide* that Lord Mountbatten advised the Indian cabinet to set up a British-style Defence Committee. The Indian leadership immediately accepted this suggestion and appointed Lord Mountbatten as the committee's chairman. According to Hodson, Mountbatten became part of the regular Indian cabinet rather than a constitutional monarch, and he presided over all-important decisions. In addition, Lord Mountbatten was the Chairman of the Joint Defence Council between India and Pakistan. Hodson argued that it was difficult for Mountbatten to maintain impartiality in the Joint Defence Council and that his decisions were influencing Indian decisions (Hodson, 1969).

A meeting was held on September 28, 1947. In a letter to Jawaharlal Nehru, Mountbatten expressed his support for military action regarding Junagadh and mentioned the deployment of secret agents. He affirmed his full backing for the continuation of the military plans and precautions that had been discussed. Furthermore, he reiterated his recommendation to establish a reliable intelligence organisation in the area as soon as possible and suggested sending up to a dozen intelligence officers or agents to ensure that accurate and timely information is gathered (Zaidi, 2003).

In a note on the Junagadh issue dated September 29, 1947, Lord Mountbatten recorded that V.P. Menon had approached him, indicating a complete disagreement between Prime Minister Nehru and Deputy Prime Minister Patel regarding the policy on Junagadh. Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel even threatened to resign if his aggressive policy towards Junagadh was not adopted (Zaidi, 2003).

On October 4th, 1947, the second meeting of the Defence Committee was held, at which the Indian leadership discussed the state of Junagadh in detail. As mentioned above, the legal status of Babariawad and Mangrol was disputed, and they were claimed by Junagadh. India decided to invade Junagadh, taking advantage of the disputed status of Mangrol and Babariawad. Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, who advocated a violent policy, expressed the same view: "If the Government of India supported Babariawad and Mangrol militarily, the question of Junagadh itself would be speedily settled" (Bhasin, 2008, No. 1967).

The Indian cabinet reassessed the situation in Junagadh and ordered the army to plan to secure the areas of Junagadh, Mangrol, and Babariawad (Bhasin, 2008, No. 1967). The Chief of General Staff of the Indian Army issued a long and detailed directive to Commander Kathiawar Defence Force, General Singh, on 10th October 1947. It outlined initial preparations for the entry of troops into Babariawad.

In addition, the deployment of a complete squadron of the Indian Navy and Air Force, along with their responsibilities, was mentioned. If one examines the official correspondence between Pakistan and India during that period, the discussion continued to focus on the legal status of Mangrol and Babariawad. In the name of the accession of these states, India continued to plan an attack on Mangrol, Babariawad, and Junagadh. The government of Pakistan has repeatedly warned India to desist from this military advance. Despite this warning, the Indian army continued its advance and captured the state of Manavadar on 22 October 1947.

Pakistan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs communicated with the Indian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stating that recent reports from Junagadh indicate that not only had Indian troops failed to evacuate Sardargarh and Bantva, but they had also deployed forces to occupy Manavadar, which had already acceded to Pakistan (Bhasin, 2008, No. 1985). During a Defence Committee meeting on October 23, 1947, Sardar Patel emphasised his policy rooted in violence and aggression. He remarked that the lack of military action against Mangrol and Babariawad demonstrated India's weakness in dealing with the princely states. While discussing the situation in Hyderabad, he noted that such a weak approach would negatively impact negotiations with the state. He underscored the need for military planning by the Indian Army to prepare for an attack on Junagadh (Bhasin, 2008, No. 1985).

When the Indian Cabinet ordered the Kathiawar Defence Force, comprising an entire brigade under the command of Sardar Gardial Singh and the forces of the Kathiawar states, to be deployed around Junagadh (Bhasin, 2008, No. 1974). Further, India planned to deploy its forces, taking advantage of the disputed status of Mangrol and Babariawad. Accordingly, the heads of the Indian Army issued a detailed instruction to Commander Kathiawar Defence Force, General Singh, on 10 October 1947. According to these instructions, preparations were initially made for the entry of troops into Babariawad. After this meeting, the No. 8 Squadron of the Royal Indian Air Force, based at Jamnagar, flew to Junagadh as a sign of the Indian Union's commitment.

The operation to occupy Junagadh by the use of force by India was crucial, especially given its short distance to Karachi, which prompted concerns within the Indian leadership about possible naval support from Pakistan. To occupy and uphold its control over Junagadh, the Indian military forces in the first stage planned to deploy a task force on the Kathiawar coast. Similarly, on October 10, 1947, guided by Chief of Staff Commodore MHSL Nott, a naval contingent was assembled, consisting of three frigates, Krishna, Kaveri, and Yamuna, as well as three fleet minesweepers, Konkan, Madras, and Rohilkhand to attack Junagadh. At the same time there were three landing craft tanks of Indian forces (LCTs) numbered 1310, 1358, and 360, and a motor launch, ML 420. This military campaign was led by Commander RD Katari, who would later rise to the position of Admiral and Chief of the Naval Staff.

Indian military force prepared for Junagadh was tasked with landing three different columns of military troops, having equipment, arms and ammunition, on the Kathiawar coast at Porbandar, Jaffarabad, and Mangrol. Following the survey, the first column, code-named 'Named', landed at Porbandar on 5th October 1947, using Kistna, Kaveri, Konkan, and Madras, with different named were given such as the first as LCTs 1310, the second as 1358, the third was 1360 and ML 420. Column Jafkul, from Krisna, Yamuna, and Konkan, with LCTs 1358 and 13S0, landed at Jaffarabad on 17th October 1947, and the third column, Ratkul, from Krisna, Kaveri, Konkan, Rohilkhand, and ML 420, landed at Mangrol on 1st November 1947 (Singh, 1992).

As highlighted in a draft declaration from a Defence Committee meeting held on October 15, 1947, it was decided that a company of Dogras from the 25th Kumaon Regiment, led by Major Shyam Ratan was sent to Kathiawar to increase pressure on Junagadh. The Indian forces, along with additional troops from the Royal Indian Engineers, the Indian Corps of Signals, and the Indian Army Medical Corps, boarded Royal Indian Navy vessels at Jaffarabad on October 17. This occupational operation by Indian forces for the occupation of Junagadh consisted of several key ships, including the sloops HMIS Kistna and HMIS Juma, HMIS Konkan (a fleet minesweeper), and LCTs 1358 and 1360. Once it was confirmed, the troops were expected to move towards Muldwarka and Kodinar (Baroda), with additional visits to other ports in Kathiawar to terrify the people as planned by Royal Indian Navy ships. The Government of India also took a decision to deploy a complete brigade group to Rajkot, commanded by Brigadier Gurdial Singh. Meanwhile, No. 8 Squadron of the Royal Indian Air Force, headed by Squadron Leader P.S. Gill and having equipment like Tempest aircraft, was stationed in the region.

India occupied Manavadar on October 22nd, 1947, and on November 1st, 1947, Indian forces also occupied Mangrol and Babariawad. When these tactics to roll back the accession of Junagadh State failed, India entered Junagadh State on November 9, 1947. After the occupation of Manavadar, Mangrol, and Babariawad, the Indian army occupied Junagadh on 9th November 1947. Nehru formally informed Pakistan of that move. Admiral Satendra Singh named the Navy's plan for the use of military force for the Junagadh occupation "Operation Peace". In New Delhi, in a meeting between Pakistani and Indian leadership on 8th December 1947, after the occupation of Junagadh State, as Mountbatten records, "Pundit Nehru openly admitted that India was somehow wrong about Junagadh" (The Statesman, September 21, 1997).

Conclusion

Junagadh was the first Muslim state of Kathiawar that acceded to Pakistan and India's subsequent response highlights the extensive and subversive political, economic, and military tools and tactics that were employed during the partition of British India to reverse the legal right

used by Junagadh. India's reaction consisted of multiple ways including diplomatic pressure, the establishment of the Arzi Hukumat, an economic blockade around the state, and eventual military intervention. Despite Junagadh's legal accession to Pakistan, India invoked the logic of geographical proximity and the Hindu majority as justifications for its opposition but forgot the same principles in Jammu and Kashmir.

The Arzi Hukumat, this is an open secret now that which was created by Indian leadership including Patel and Menon, led by Samaldas Gandhi, played a crucial role in mobilising resistance to the Nawab's decision. Indian leadership strategically supported this provisional government to foster internal opposition. At the same time, the economic blockade severely affected Junagadh's administration, leading to food shortages and financial instability. The military intervention began with the occupation of Mangrol and Babariawad and ended with the Indian army entering Junagadh on November 9, 1947, effectively annexing the region.

Pakistan always maintained that India's actions in Junagadh after its valid and legal accession were a violation of its sovereignty, a breach of international law and territorial integrity but its diplomatic protests failed to prevent the annexation. This historical event highlights broader themes in the partition process, including India's aggressive integration of princely states and the failure to uphold the principles and norms that were initially provided by the British. The Indian actions also exemplify how realpolitik and power struggles dictated the fate of princely states, overshadowing legal frameworks and diplomatic norms.

References

- Ali, C. M. (1967). *The emergence of Pakistan*. Columbia University Press.
- Bhasin, A. S. (Ed.). (2012). *India-Pakistan relations 1947–2007: A documentary study* (Vol. 6). Public Diplomacy Division, Ministry of External Affairs, by Geetika Publishers.
- Bangash, Y. K. (2015). *A princely affair: The accession and integration of the princely states of Pakistan 1947–1955*. Oxford University Press.
- Burke, S. M., & Quraishi, S. D. (1994). *The British Raj in India: An historical review*. Oxford University Press.
- Corfield, C. (1975). *The princely India I knew: From Curzon to Mountbatten*. Indo-British Historical Society.
- Dastur Amal, Sarkar Junagadh (Press communiqué). (1947, August 16). (F. 124 (8)–GG/13). National Archives of Pakistan, Islamabad.
- Declaration of Junagadh's accession to Pakistan. (1947, August 24). *Dawn*.
- Dar, F. A. (2014). *Jinnah's Pakistan: Formation and challenges of a state*. Oxford University Press.
- Das, D. (Ed.). (1973). *Sardar Patel's correspondence, 1945–50: Vol. V. Control of Bureaucracy, Inter-State Relations, Junagadh and Hyderabad*. Navajivan Publishing House.
- Gandhi, M. K. (1958–1994). *The collected works of Mahatma Gandhi* (Vols. 1–100). Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India.
- Guha, R. (2007). *India after Gandhi: The history of the world's largest democracy*. Pan Macmillan.
- Government of India, Ministry of States. (1948). *White paper on Indian states*. Government of India Information Services.
- Hodson, H. V. (1969). *The great divide: Britain-India-Pakistan*. Hutchinson.
- Jani, S. V. (1998). *Junagadhna navabi shasanno ant* [The end of the Nawab's rule in Junagadh]. Pravin Prakashan.
- Jani, S. V. (1990). *Saurashtrano itihās* [History of Saurashtra]. Pravin Prakashan.
- Jani, S. V. (2010). *Saurashtrano itihās* [History of Saurashtra]. Rangdwar Prakashan.
- Mahabat Khan III. (1947, September 15). *Instrument of Accession of Junagadh State*. Ministry of States, Government of Pakistan.
- Mansergh, N., & Lumby, E. W. R. (Eds.). (1983). *Constitutional relations between Britain and India: The transfer of power 1942–47: Vol. 12. The Mountbatten Viceroyalty: Princes, partition and independence, 8 July–15 August 1947*. Her Majesty's Stationery Office.
- Menon, V. P. (1956). *The story of the integration of the Indian states*. Orient BlackSwan.

- Nawab of Junagadh. (1947, August 15). Letter to M. A. Jinnah regarding accession (F. 124 (8)–GG/9). National Archives of Pakistan, Islamabad.
- Nawab of Junagadh. (1947, August 11). Letter to M. A. Jinnah regarding the political situation of Junagadh (F. 124 (8)–GG/5). National Archives of Pakistan, Islamabad.
- Nehru, J. (2013). *Selected works of Jawaharlal Nehru: Second series* (M. K. Palat, Ed.; Vol. 4). Oxford University Press.
- Press notes issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Pakistan. (1947, September 17). *Dawn*.
- Raghavan, S. (2010). *War and peace in modern India: A strategic history of the Nehru years*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Singh, S. (1992). *From blueprint to bluewater: The Indian Navy 1951–1965*. South Asia Books.
- Zaidi, Z. H. (Ed.). (2003). *Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah papers: The states: Historical and policy perspectives and accession to Pakistan* (Vol. 8). Quaid-i-Azam Papers Project, National Archives of Pakistan.