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Pak-US Security Relation: Challenges & Prospects for Pakistan

ABSTRACT

Survival and independence are the essential ingredients of the existence of a community, society, nation and state. Both are being processed through security mechanism and policies by the nation's status in international politics. Therefore, security is multifaceted phenomenon based on requirements, competence and qualms of intermingling entities. Security can also be understood as freedom from all kinds of fears. Security is a concept that is not only dependent on external factors but it is also dependent on psychological orientations of the people. In this regard perception plays an important role which is the outcome of past experiences, time duration and surroundings. Similarly, Pak-US military alliance in mid 1950s is the outcome of threat perception. Since Pakistan perception of state security remained India centric and US major aim was containment of communism. This paper also discusses that how during the times of need the US extended its support to Pakistan and abandoned it after its objectives are realized. Nevertheless, the

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occurrence of 9/11 opened a new chapter in security relationship of Pakistan and United States, since terrorism emerged as a new threat to state security. It was this new security set up that led to the commencement of Pak-US strategic dialogue in 2006, to give new meaning to the decade's old partnership. And to attend one of such meeting, US Secretary John Kerry visited Pakistan in January 2015, where representative of both the countries announced to continue their mutual efforts in eradicating terrorism and fostering peace in Afghanistan. They also discuss the matter of reimbursement to Pakistan after the expiry of Coalition Support Fund at the end of 2015. Moreover, US announced to extend its support to Pakistan in other fields as well, and both the countries affirmed to further strengthen their bilateral relations.

■ Introduction

Survival and independence are the essential ingredients of the existence of a community, society, nation and state. Both are being processed through security mechanism and policies by the nation's status in international politics. Therefore, security is multifaceted phenomenon based on requirements, competence and qualms of intermingling entities. (Rizvi, 1986) Parallel to national interest state security is an established concept in international relations that being an objective of state policy distinguish from other state. The core rationale of security is not only endurance of state but to survive devoid of any risk of external aggression. (Alagppa, 1998) The security of the state largely depends on its geo strategic position in terms of global and regional setting in ascertaining the foreign policy of a state. The location of the

state molds all other factors as it determines the potential enemy and allies.

Besides, the external factors, it is a phenomenon that is deeply seated in the minds of policy planners and the people of that country and that can be attributed to past event and the prevailing conditions. It is strongly associated with the fear induced by the internal and external environment. In this feeling of fear and insecurity perception plays an important role. Perception develops with the past experiences, time span and circumstances. However, sometimes this perception turns out to be a misperception. (Jervis, 1976) It is war or threat of war that turns this perception into reality. For understanding security perception of developing states three constituent are important i.e. war, threat and budget allocation for defense purpose.

Similarly, in Pak-US relations security perception plays pivotal role since Pakistan security perception remained India centric. It was not only Indian factor but also a geostrategic location of Pakistan that added to the security problems of Pakistan. On the other side it was threat of expansion of communism that justified the US presence in the periphery. Thus the interests of both the states coincided and both states signed a military pact in 1954. Though in this bilateral relation US played the role of dominating power but still there existed mutual dependency between these two states. (Farooq Hasnat, 1986)

Similarly, the 9/11 episode made Pakistan an important stakeholder in regional security set up for US. Consequently, Pakistan revisited its security policy of Afghanistan and had to support US attack on Afghanistan, and this drift in security relations evolved the phenomenon of comprehensive security in Pakistan and US security relations. Since US action

against the terrorists in Afghanistan bears multidimensional security threats for Pakistan. In addition to this, growing militancy within the boundaries and US tilt towards India led to ever growing security threats to Pakistan. (Mazari, 2006) Robert Gilpin expressed the same view that in asymmetrical alliances the powerful state determines the lines of security that have certain ramifications for the weaker state. (Gilpin) This research encompasses the concept of comprehensive security and sees post 9/11 Pak-US security under the lens of enlarge security, predominantly the economic, political and military facets of their bilateral relations.

In post 9/11 scenario religious militancy in Afghanistan and its next door neighbor Pakistan posed threat to the global security. Consequently, fight against terrorism becomes the distinguishing characteristics of security relations between Pakistan and United States. Nevertheless, the new partnership bears negative impacts on Pakistan since in this new journey security risks for Pakistan are higher than United States.

Bearing in mind these impacts, former President Pervez Musharraf categorized security threats to Pakistan from four different aspects i.e. protection from external peril, revivification of economy, safeguard of nuclear possessions and backing on Kashmir issue, but the utmost apprehension for Pakistan was the fear of being a target of US ruthlessness earlier indicated by the later. Pakistan was left with no option but to bandwagon in asymmetrical alliance relation with the mighty United States. Under new United States security mechanism Pakistan acquired a pivotal place since no US strategy of hunting Al-Qaeda operatives could be possible without bringing Pakistan under its umbrella. According to Robert G. Wiring the mutual dependence of Pakistan and United States on each other

settles on the course of Pak-US alliance. (Wiring, 2003) To understand the evolving security mechanism between United States and Pakistan, it is indispensable to be acquainted with the history of Pak-US security relations.

■ **Historical Perspective of Pak-US Security Relations**

The Pak-US relationship, in the sixth decade of its being has developed over the sequential phase of war on terror, and, since its commencement, has been categorized by frequent "peaks" and "valleys". Several stages --- early reluctance, alignment, insularism, "tilt" embitterment, and then readjustment --- have been the assay-marks of this consensual affiliation.

Since Pakistan's creation their bilateral relations are watched over by vested interests on both sides, primarily dealing the issues of national security, regional constancy and strategic interests. To be more accurate, the major objectives of Pakistan's foreign policy in general and with regard to United States in particular, are its territorial integrity, feasible politico-economic system and regional constancy. One can envision many other epitomes in tracking down of these objectives such as equilibrating ties with the major neighboring giants and concerted ties with the Muslim world.

Likewise United States followed up its own interests in the region depending upon the vacillating regional and global happenings. US objectives in South and Southwest Asia can be characterized as filling power vacuity, containing communism, regional steadiness, single state security, promotion of regional cooperation, manifestation in Indian

Ocean, facilitation of forces and bases between Pacific and Atlantic, conserving regional power balance, and promoting Westernization and pro-western influences. If one closely analyzes the objectives tracked through foreign policy by both Pakistan and United States, he will find apparent convergence of interest on many issues. While analyzing the converging interests of Pakistan and United States, the regional security set-up can be compounded under sub-continental and southwestern prospects.

■ **The Sub-continental Panorama**

India holds vital position in South Asia due to number of factors including its size and resources that gives it upper hand over its other South Asian neighbors. It always tried to endorse British legacy in its relations with Soviet Union, Afghanistan and Iran alongside its aspiration of naval supremacy in Indian Ocean. Disintegration of Pakistan in 1971, Indian nuclear test in 1974 and the role played by it in Sri Lanka are few examples in the long list of accusations against India. India's muffled policy during Soviet intervention and despite of Pakistan's heightened security quandary, adopted an intimidating stance over Pakistan's nuclear program and equipped military force. It is because of this reason that Pakistan contemplates India a bigger threat than Taliban, terrorism and extremism. Pakistan had calculated her risk factor, and concluded that terrorism is acceptable to them, whereas, Indian aggression or hegemony is unacceptable to them. Therefore, it was a calculated decision by the military establishment to go into military alliances with USA, because in the long run the impact of those alliances can be minimized, whereas, if Pak

let India to override Pakistan's interest it would be irreparable loss for Pakistan since, Pakistan's security policy is India centric, and there is no other target for Pakistan against whom its security paradigms is established but India.¹ Since Pakistan is not only confronting the Indian violations on LOC, but India is very much active in Afghanistan as well that heightened security threats on its western border.

■ Southwest Asian Panorama

The loss of buffer status by Afghanistan after Soviet invasion left long lasting traces on security developments of South Asia. Pakistan of course reluctant, was dragged into the crisis that ultimately put burden of millions of refugees on Pakistan, also the turmoil brought security threats to its territorial sovereignty besides its own tempestuous history of ethno-nationalist movements. Pakistan being situated at the junction of South and Southwest Asia could do nothing but be regulated by the external happenings.

Hence, being an important regional player, Pakistan played its part in bringing peace in Afghanistan and its support to Afghanistan cause and efforts for peace culminated into Geneva Accord in April 1988. Withdrawals of Soviet forces from Afghanistan can surely be a result of Afghan resistance backed by Pakistan. However, Pakistan had paid and is still paying the cost in terms of financial loss and loss of manpower. Therefore, War on Terror can truly be accredited to a second season of Afghan crisis. Besides describing the recent development in Southwest Asia, it is pertinent to note that in first season of

¹ Dr. Shahid Khattak, Assistant Professor, Department of International Relations, University of Peshawar. Interview with the author on March 11, 2014 in Peshawar

Afghan crisis, United States left Pakistan with many unresolved issues that led to the politics of perception and misperception.

■ **Politics of Insight/Muddle**

When it comes to discussing Pak-US bilateralism, the role played by their mutual perception and dark images cannot easily be ignored that accentuates the convergence and divergence of the interests. United States contact with this region owing to the geographical and cultural factors and British legacy leads to gap of information about the region. Additionally, Indo-Pak rivalry seemed to be a tough link for US policy makers, since the complexities of subcontinent were inexplicable for US policy planners. Similarly, South Asian states gazed at United States as the most unpredictable and fly-by-night power whose relations with the regional states oscillate with its own global interests. (Rose, 1988)

India gazed Pak-US alliance in 1950s, 1980s and post 9/11 as irritating factor while, Pakistan alleged that from the very beginning United States is endorsing the interests and hegemonic designs of India. India was/is considered as "the darling" state of Asia for superpowers despite its initial stance in Cold War and then in Afghan crisis, as it was vowed by both the superpowers during Cold War and now by United States. Pakistan has some reservations about the temporary nature of US pledge, since Pakistan is not in US urgencies, rather its precedence list includes Europe, Southeast Asia and reinforcing an "extra-South Asia factor" in its goals. Pakistanis felt deflated because of imperturbability shown by United States during second half

of 1960s and 1970s. In 1980s Pakistan was discriminated by US on nuclear issue.

Since its engagement in South Asia, United States has shown interest in India, this is the reason why most of the South Asian specialists have been expert of Indian Studies. (Hayes, 1986) However, US never contemplate any external force a threat to South Asia rather it kept itself aloof from Indo-Pak rivalry. It has some economic interests in the region that are clearly imitated by Indo-US commercial, technical and military ventures over the past decades. However, the tilt shown by US towards India by no means establish that US regional interests can be realized by casting-off Pakistan. It is Pakistan's geo-strategic location that drags Pakistan in US orbit and is a source of bumpy relations between US and Pakistan.

■ **Bilateralism Reentered**

The security arrangements between Pakistan and United States commenced in 1950s and ended in the mid of 1960s when United States put arms embargo against Pakistan. The divergence between their interests left Pakistan with the feeling of being cast-off by United States. US-Soviet rapprochement, US engagement in Vietnam War and its intimacy with Moscow and New Delhi against China became another irritant between Pak-US relations. Similarly, Pakistan's closer ties with Peoples Republic of China (PRC) were not welcomed by United States. The broken security arrangements between United States and Pakistan in 1965 continued for next 15 years. In 1970s Pakistan felt discriminated by US for making its nuclear program a sticking

point. Even Z.A. Bhutto's regime was deemed to be under strong pressure of United States. (Bhutto, 1988).

The decade of 1980s marked the new beginning of the sour relations by reappraisal from both sides. Revival of the relation in 1980s stemmed from security arrangements in domestic, regional and global perspective. Security threat amplified for Pakistan from its western border that made the situation in Middle East unstable coupled with security threat from eastern border. Likewise its domestic susceptibilities coincided with US assessments of new developments in the region. Though there still existed some divergence of interests but their bilateral relation continued efficaciously. The vital constituents of this bilateralism are: variegation of channels, military and economic aid, regional congruence, agreement on nuclear issue and democracy.

The gap of about 15 years created disconsolateness and estrangement on both sides. Pakistan felt cast-off by its partner by supporting India. The Nixon Doctrine invigorated such regional power to play a leading role that made Pakistan feel herself a tiniest significant state of the region. These feelings coupled with Carter administration efforts of compelling France to retreat its commitment of providing Pakistan reprocessing plant, gave rise to anti-American sentiments. During this period US assistance to Pakistan touched its lowest level.

With regional development of 1979, Pakistan emerged as the largest beneficiary of aid after Israel and Egypt. Military aid, technical training programs and negotiation on regional issues resulted in diplomatic and military cooperation between Pakistan and United States, that gave rise to American writings on Pakistan, joint conferences and visits, convergence of interests and increasing part played by US agencies that supported Pakistan both in short and long-term ventures.

(Woodward, 1987) Such cooperative measures in civil and military fields continued when Pakistan being ethnologically assorted and under the military regime, was trying to engross US cultural "assault" along with its own grave problem of urban violence.

American aid package was provided keeping in view the heightened security fears. However military aid dominated the aid package during 1980s. Pakistan's complaint over ever increasing regional threats to its security led to its military up-gradation. It is astonishing to note that India being powerful in all three forces in terms of weapons, manpower and hardware, felt jeopardized by US military aid to Pakistan. It was quite clear for Pakistan to have strong defense at its priority in relations with US, but it was by no means intended to intimidate its eastern neighbor. Afghan penetration in Pakistan, violation of Pakistan's air space, presence of Soviet forces on its western border rationalize Pakistan's decision to acquire F-16s, AWACs, armored carriers and frigates. By 1990 many foreign policy experts both in US and Pakistan were of the view that this aid would continue even after the changes befell in regional scenario.²

By 1980s, Pak-US bilateralism endeavored to deal with flimsy regional power balance structure. There were mounting concern of Indian role of regional policeman; even superpowers were subjected to criticism for its support to India. Whenever Pakistan raised its voice against India it was identified as the "typical cry" or a tactic used to pull strings of the external powers. However, India's intervention in Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and blockade against Nepal in 1989 was the similar instances as earlier raised by Pakistan. Geo- military situation of South Asia favored India but at the same time

² Frontier Post, 14 April, 1989.

made the region precarious leading to India's own internal problems. The approach to deal with regional problems is unvarying approach adopted by Pakistan from the beginning and by United States lately.

Though Afghanistan situation is posing a great threat to regional security yet it is a point of convergence between Pakistan and United States. Mujahedin fight against Soviet force backed by Pakistan at the expense of its relations with Soviet Union³ has been the assay-mark of 1980s. The extended war in Afghanistan generated pressure in Pakistan for overt support to Mujahedin and to discern their Interim Government (AIG). (Lamb, 1989) Bhutto was under grave pressure domestically to recognize AIG while jeopardized by the Soviet Union of spill out of Afghan embroilment. In the meantime different circle analyzed impact of Afghan crisis on Pak-US relations. In 1989, Bhutto paid an official visit to United States where leaders of both the states decided to devise a strategy to resolve Afghan crisis.

During 1980s, the major irritant between Pak-US relations was nuclear program of Pakistan; the decision to "go nuclear" was taken to deter Indian peril. Therefore while considering aid package for Pakistan, United States felt pressure domestically as well as externally. However, contemplating its regional and global interest, US government agreed to provide aid to Pakistan with certain legislative check and balances. Sanctions imposed on Pakistan under Symington Amendment were also lifted under certification provided by US President. United States was in quandary, because if it halts aid package, Pakistan will continue its nuclear program unilaterally, and it will undermine its posture on Afghanistan. Similarly if US

³ The Nation, 14 April, 1989.

continue to support Pakistan while overlooking its nuclear programs it would be like upsetting Congress and other group opinion. Thus US had to find a midway to deal the issue. (Spector, 1985) However, United States who regarded Pakistan's nuclear issues a major irritant to their bilateral relation, slowly but surely consented regional constraints of Pakistan's security dilemma in 1980s. Despite of all US understanding of Pakistan's security dilemma, nuclear issue will remain bone of contention in their bilateral relations and nuclear detonation by Pakistan in 1998 brought sanctions on Pakistan that further worsened relations between them. However, the event of 9/11 changed the whole scenario since it had deeply affected the security policy of United States that was clearly reflected in Washington campaign against Taliban and Al-Qaeda. United States took no time to recognize Osama Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda mastermind of these attacks. Shortly, after the attacks Bush addressed the nation on television and said "an apparent terrorist act, and those who committed it will be taken to task and terrorism against our nation will not stand." In his meeting with the Vice President he said that "we are at war." (Woodward, Bush at War, 2002)

Similarly, US Secretary of state while issuing a statement said that it is to make clear to Afghanistan and Pakistan that "this is the show time." At that time Taliban were at the helm of affairs in Afghanistan that took power in 1996, now providing protection to Al-Qaeda in reoccurrence of financial backing, while Pakistan's intelligence institution played its part in consolidating Taliban regime. (James)

■ **Pak-US Security Relationship after 9/11**

The recent strategic partnership between Pakistan and United States is proving to be an acid test for Pakistan. US identification of Taliban regime in Afghanistan as patron of terrorist attacks in United States and in retort its first target in Afghanistan put Pakistan in grave catastrophe. Again it was the Pakistan's geographical factor that led to the revival of alliance. Pakistan acceptance of US offer to join the war is not an astonishing decision. Pakistan's partnership in the war ruptured its ties with Afghanistan. Domestically too Pakistan is feeling the heat since the debate of Pakistan's joining war on terror is passing by all the other issues among the common masses.

Change in global security settings in general and South Asia in particular have deep impacts on Pak-US alliance. Stephen

P. Cohen argued "no part of the world was more affected by the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 than South Asia." (Cohan, 2001) US identification of Osama and Al-Qaeda mastermind of the terrorist attacks was the clear indication of the fact that Afghanistan is surely going to face the fierce policy of US and since Afghanistan is a landlocked country therefore it is the territory of Pakistan that provides an outlet for attack on Afghanistan. Therefore, Musharraf was asked to take side of US or be ready to face the outcomes of supporting Taliban. In his book Musharraf wrote that he did this in the interest of the country and that other decision might hurt Pakistan's interest. (Musharraf, 2006)

On September 13, 2001 Armitage fork out list of US seven demands on Pakistan to the director ISI. These demands were; not to support Al-Qaeda forces along its border and halt logistic support to them as well, provide US States with over-flight and landing rights for military and

intelligence activities, provide US with territorial entrée for intelligence and military operations against Al-Qaeda, share intelligence information with United States, openly condemn terrorism, to stop fuel shipment to Taliban, and breakdown link with Taliban government, if indication are found that they are protecting Al-Qaeda. (Abbas, 2005)

It was a kind of indirect threat to Pakistan that if you turn down to join the war on terror then you will be gazed as a terrorist. Bringing Pakistan under US umbrella for its fight against terrorism was the important constituent of US policy. However, Musharraf demanded for waiver of sanctions inflicted during 1990s, resumption of arm supply, giving debt relief and proviso of loans from IMF and World Bank. Although CIA was not in favor to show so much conviction in ISI, but the later intelligence network in Afghanistan left CIA with no choice. (Hussain, 2007) From thereafter, we can see transformation in their bilateral relationship since Pakistan's decision to join US led war on terror opened new avenues for both the countries; with this decision Pakistan's standing for US regional security set up got elevated. Both the countries took decisive actions to take away all the hurdles that deteriorated their bilateral relations in post-cold war period and resolute to determine their relations on new lines encompassing terrorism, security and political and economic fields.

■ US Aid To Pakistan after 9/11

After a decade of disinterest, the traditional allies came closer to each other with terrorist attacks on US on September 11, 2001. Consequently, US post 9/11 aid all of a sudden rose up and comprised \$600 million cash transfer in September, 2001. In 2003, Pakistani president visited Camp

David where he negotiated \$3 billion aid package based on five years that began in 2005 consistently dispersed between economic and military aid. ." (Woodward, Bush at War, 2002)

The initial approach of Obama administration towards Pakistan was to upsurge nonmilitary aid to three times with particular emphasis on war affected zone and to augment aid package with the strings of effectively combating radicalism and democratization, attached to it. The 110th Congress, President, Vice President and Secretary of State all supported EPPA and sought it to be passed by the next session of Congress.

Initially the 111th Congress passed Pakistan Enduring Assistance and Cooperation Enhancement Act of 2009 and 3 months later passed EPPA of 2009 popularly known as Kerry Lugar Bill. Both the acts multiplied aid to three times. President Obama signed EPPA in October 2009. Senate Foreign Relation Committee Chairman and Secretary of State reckoned the legislation as consequence of two-tier, dual-party and inter branch discussion that was a smart move towards consolidation of relation between people of both the state. The Chairman of Foreign Affair Committee accredited the legislation as move towards the direction of factual strategic partnership.

EPPA approved \$1.5 billion annually for economic and development purpose from FY2010-FY2014. The act support democratization, rule of law and maintainable economic development. The act provides that funds will be made available on the compliance of Pakistan Assistance Strategy Report by administration to specific Congressional Committee. The act also limits aid to \$750 million till the authorization by President's Special Representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan that reasonable development has

been made in the direction to attain the anticipated US objectives.

A November 2011 State Department report assert that the approach of KLB is ground-breaking in four ways:

1. It attached standing with Pakistan penchant
2. It emphasis on communication links and dams (energy sector)
3. Attention on the areas susceptible to radicalism
4. Government toil that taps mastery from an assortment of American organizations

The act provided for each year, from FY2010-FY2014, the amount as be essential for security assistance. The act did not let for security assistance and arms transfer except Secretary of State certifies that government of Pakistan is working effectively to combat extremist activities and political and judicial courses are going unimpeded. ("Kerry-Lugar Bill Interference in Pakistan's Affairs: ANP.", 2009.) Such strings can be waived if Secretary of State considered it required in the state interest. Such certificates were first issued by Clinton in March 2011. To further strengthen their partnership against war on terror, United States started strategic dialogues with Pakistan and affirmed to provide security assistance to Pakistan. In this regard role of Defense Consultative Group cannot be overlooked.

■ **Pak-US Defense Consultative Group**

For the better acquaintance and harmonization towards a unwavering relationship between the two cohorts directly fighting the War on Terror, Pakistan and the US started 'Pak-US Strategic Dialogue' as a stage to talk over and authorize projections of interest between the two in a more formal manner. The Strategic Dialogue helps the two sides to

deliberate policies to make advancement and develop synchronized efforts in field of defense, education, science and technology, economy and energy. (Mehmud Ali Durrani Former Ambassador of Pakistan to the United States answering the question from the press in Washington) To expedite the process of mutual cooperation, the two sides review the progress of 'Strategic Dialogue's' under five working groups i.e. 1) Energy; 2) Security, Strategic Stability, and Nonproliferation; 3) the Defense Consultative Group; 4) Law Enforcement and Counterterrorism; and 5) Economics and Finance.

Among these working groups, DCG is a prime forum that works for fostering mutual cooperation in bringing peace to Afghanistan and sustenance of defense partnership beyond 2014 and advancing joint security interests. ("US-Pakistan Consultative Group meeting held," 2014) Pak-US Defense Consultative Group (DCG) invigorated during Bush administration, as a result discussion started on military collaboration, security assistance and counterterrorism. It sustained its activities during Obama administration. However, US officials were not contented with Pakistan's counterterrorist efforts. Reports depicted that US officials got irritated by Pakistan's sluggish efforts to reorient its army for counterterrorism since Pakistan forces were not eager about the chore achievement. Working under this group US in an effort to channelize security assistance, shaped Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund (PCF) later on rechristened as Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund (PCCF) and to enhance level of mutual understanding.⁴

⁴ Appearing before both Senate and House panels in May 2009, Secretary of Defense Gates urged Congress to quickly provide significant new counterinsurgency funding for Pakistan, arguing that the newly authorized

There is mutual understanding on both sides; both sides understand each other's standpoint not only on war on terror but on regional security issues as well. This level of cooperation between them develops Pakistan's perception that United States is now cognizant of Pakistan's security trepidations vis-à-vis Afghanistan. With the same spirit the 23rd meeting of the group was hosted by Washington on December 9 & 10, 2014. US post 2014 policy vis-à-vis Pak-Afghan security issues and progress on Operation Zarb-i-Azb were the foreground of the meeting. Both the sides expressed their content on the development of bilateral relations and declared that mutual collaboration is indispensable for regional peace and security and for obliteration of Al-Qaeda and all other form of militancy. Contemplation on strategic priorities of both countries was also made the part of the discussion and future defense cooperation was also agreed upon.

Both United States and Pakistan substantiated the implication of ongoing military operation in North Waziristan, which US acknowledged has interrupted the terrorists. Pakistan briefed US on the military operations on Pak-Afghan border areas, while US briefed Pakistan on changing security calculus in Afghanistan comprising the strategies of US forces to train the national security forces of Afghanistan over the years ahead.

Both the sides appreciated the efforts of their respective forces and the sacrifices, made by military personnel and civilian in fighting against terrorism. Security challenges confronted by the region were also reviewed during the meeting and need for regional peace and security was underscored. The two sides also deliberated the mechanism

PCF/PCCF should be overseen by U.S. military commanders rather than by State Department civilians. Yet many in Congress voiced doubts about the wisdom of creating a major new stream of military funding under Pentagon oversight, as such aid traditionally has been subject to Foreign Assistance Act restrictions. When the House Appropriations Committee took up the issue, its members determined to place PCCF oversight in the hands of the State Department after FY2010, a plan then endorsed by the full House ("Gates Pushes Congress to Boost Pakistan Aid." *Washington Post*, May 1, 2009.

of reimbursement to Pakistan after the expiry of Coalition Support Fund at the end of 2015. ("US-Pakistan Consultative Group meeting held," 2014)

■ Coalition Support Fund (CSF)

Pakistan is strategic partner of US in war on terror where US is assisting Pakistan's counterterrorism activities to squelch the sanctuaries of militants, enhance border security and achieve the objectives of Operation Enduring Freedom through Coalition Support Fund that provide assistance for mutually agreed the cost incurred by Pakistan in this war. (The United States and Pakistan: Strong and Enduring Cooperation, , 2015) During Bush administration, Congress in FY2002 set aside millions of dollars to pay back Pakistan and other countries easing US in counterterrorist activities. Since 2001, half of financial transfer from Coalition Support Fund (CSF) established for the purpose is made to Pakistan and till June 2013 the total amount laid out was nearly \$10.7 billion. Out of the amount, only 2% was provided for navy and air force while rest was paid for Pakistan army under CSF. Source of Defense Department provides that CSF was used for 1, 00,000 troops engaged in North West of Pakistan for their food, Clothing, housing and armament. Pakistan is also paid for coalition use of air bases and seaports. In 2010, Richard Holbrooke Special Representative for Afghanistan-Pakistan Ambassador asserted that 60%-65% of Pakistan's request under CSF are realized (an official document depicts that \$688 million remunerated in December 2012 signify 68% of total request made).

Apart from the aid provided under the security assistance program, US humanitarian assistance is also a distinguished accomplishment for Pakistan. The aid provided after 2005 earthquake and 2010 flood are worth mentioning. Likewise, US had also set up developmental plan for FATA for ameliorating health and education facilities, particularly US is providing aid to facilitate the people of war affected zone since operation launched against the militants in tribal areas of Pakistan forced the inhabitants to migrate to other areas

of the country that put pressure on the government to provide basic facilities to the temporarily displaced people. On the similar occasion, when US Secretary of State John Kerry visited Pakistan in January 2015 to attend Strategic Dialogues between Pakistan and US, both the states emphasized the long-term cooperation between them and affirmed to collaborate on the following areas of ongoing activities.

■ **Support for Temporarily Displaced Persons from FATA**

During his visit to Pakistan US Secretary John Kerry reaffirmed to underpin Pakistan's efforts to address the needs of 700,000 temporarily displaced persons (TDPs), and announced that US will provide \$250 million as food aid, health, subsistence, livestock and maintenances. US also pledged to assist Pakistan in reconstruction of war affected zones of Pakistan.

■ **Defense & Counterterrorism Cooperation**

Both US and Pakistan enjoys strong bonding in their security relationship and US extends its support to Pakistan, in case of any malignant peril to Pakistan's internal security and shore up Pakistan in chastening the culprits of December 16, incident. Operation Zarb-e-Azb is an important move to destroy the safe heavens of the militants in FATA. Under US security plans, United States provides crucial equipment to Pakistani troops for launching operation against the militants on Pak-Afghan border areas and to increase Pakistan's role in international maritime security operation. US support to Pakistan is turning out to be beneficial in flushing out the militants effectively. US is also assisting Pakistan in eradicating terrorism in all its forms including those posing threat to regional stability like Al-Qaeda, TTP, Haqqani network and Lashkar-e-Tayyiba.

■ **Military Training & Exchanges**

Pak-US military training program is another joint venture that leads to further mutual cooperation. Since 2009, approximately 1,120 members of Pakistan army, navy and air force have been trained by US. Pakistan is the larger beneficiary of International Military Education and Training (IMET). Moreover, both the states are also conducting joint training and military staff exchange annually to ameliorate cooperation and interoperability between the militaries of the two states.

■ **Improvised Explosive Devices**

In collaboration with US, Pakistan has taken some momentous steps to prevent the illegal supply of explosive material used to produce Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) that poses serious security threat to Pakistan, Afghanistan and the region as well. In collaboration with Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIJEDDO), United States is providing expertise and equipment to Pakistan to enhance its capacity to identify and neutralize such devices. (The United States & Pakistan: Strong & Enduring Cooperation)

■ **Conclusion**

World politics underwent the process of change with the end of cold-war that also brought changes in the concept of security. It also brought changes in the art of war. Trans-boundary crimes, trans-boundary threats and terrorism have emerged as a new form of wars confronted by states. These new emerging conditions transformed the concept of security identified by Barry Buzan as "enlarged security." In this sense, it can be rightly said that security is multidimensional concept, though military is a cardinal element of state security but other aspects of security cannot be overlooked, since state having instable economy and political institutions cannot be deemed as secure. Therefore, the incident of 9/11 can be accredited for being responsible in transforming the concept of security because the evolving

conditions of global politics diversified the threats confronted by states. Hence, Pak-US security relations after 9/11 can be viewed from different facets.

Pakistan's decision to join US led war on terror transformed its Afghan and Taliban policy. During Soviet-Afghan war Pakistan played the role of frontline state, while the alliance diluted due to nuclear detonation and then military coup. However, 9/11 again elevated the Pakistan's position in the eyes of US policy planners. Although by joining the war, Pakistan made compromise on its short-term policy objectives by discerning terrorism as a security threat but overall Pakistan's threat perception remained India centric. (Oklay Robert, 2009) US on the other side avowed Pakistan a "pivotal state" and its leadership "a voice of moderation and reason in the Islamic world." Islamabad being aware of the anti-American sentiments accentuated US pledge to long-term association with Pakistan. In 2004, Pakistan earned the title of US major non-NATO ally. Although, both the traditional allies after becoming partners in war on terror expressed warmness in their relations but still there are some irritants like Pakistan's nuclear program, presence of Osama in Abbottabad and US operation to capture Osama, issue of drone attacks, that turn down the enthusiastic beginning of this relationship. Both United States and Pakistan are facing pressure domestically because of the trust deficit founded on both sides. Regardless of all this tension both are playing their part in eradicating militancy with harsh fact that with all of their exertions both the strategic partner failed to knock off the terrorists.

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